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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                                   
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge 
 Jack Villanueva, Administrator pendente lite of the Estate 
of Ella Ostroff, appeals from a directed verdict in favor of the 
law firm of Brown and Michael, its partners: G. Michael Brown and 
Guy Michael (hereinafter the firm and its partners are 
collectively referred to as “Brown & Michael”), and Helen Conn, a 
notary.1  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm the 
                     
     1 As is noted below, Ella Ostroff died prior to the time 
this suit went to trial and Jack Villanueva was subsequently 
appointed administrator pendente lite. Accordingly, we will refer 





judgment in favor of Brown & Michael, but will reverse the 
judgment in favor of Helen Conn, and remand for a determination 
of (1) whether Ostroff's acts constituted a ratification of the 
disbursements of her funds from the attorneys' trust account; and 
(2) whether -- if Ostroff's acts did not constitute ratification 
-- Conn's negligence caused injury to Ostroff and, if so, what 
damages ensued. 
 
 I. Background 
 This case is about a sophisticated investor in the twilight 
of her years named Ella Ostroff, her accountant (Joseph 
Rubinstein), a “deal maker” (Samuel Rubin), a law firm (Brown and 
Michael), its two named partners, and a notary public (Helen 
Conn).  The issues before us arise from Ms. Ostroff’s involvement 
with, and investment in, a real estate project in St. Lucia. 
 The saga began in 1988 when Samuel Rubin was working on a 
project that was to become the St. Lucia Hotel and Casino (the 
"Project").  After concluding negotiations with St. Lucian 
government officials, Rubin entered into numerous agreements to 
incorporate the St. Lucia Hotel Corporation ("Corporation").  In 
the spring of 1989, Rubin began to look for "seed money" 
investors to pay Corporation expenses until the financing was in 
place.  Joseph Rubinstein was an accountant at the time, and one 
of his clients was Ella Ostroff.  The Estate claims that 
Rubinstein induced Ostroff to place $250,000 in the trust account 
of the New Jersey law firm of Brown and Michael.  It is alleged 





Corporation’s law firm, that her funds were to be used to pay 
ongoing Corporation expenses, and that the Project was a good 
investment opportunity for her.  According to the Estate, 
although Ostroff had not met Rubin, she placed the money into the 
account pending receipt of additional information about the 
Project.  The Estate also asserts that, sometime in April of 
1989, Rubin and Rubinstein told Ostroff she would receive a 3% 
interest in the Project in return for her investment, and that 
her investment would be returned to her in stages. 
 Eventually, Rubin introduced Rubinstein to G. Michael Brown 
and Guy Michael, the named partners in the law firm of Brown and 
 Michael.  That firm represented Sam Rubin and the Corporation. 
Rubinstein informed Brown and Michael that he was Ostroff's 
accountant; however, he apparently did not represent himself to 
be Ostroff's financial or business advisor.  Messrs. Brown and 
Michael were apparently aware that Rubinstein was the accountant 
for both Ostroff and the Corporation. 
 The instant legal dispute is rooted in a series of three 
checks that Rubinstein wrote between May 19, 1989, and June 26, 
1989.  Each of the checks was drawn on Ostroff's account, written 
by Rubinstein, signed by Ostroff, and made payable to, and 
deposited in, the Brown and Michael trust account.  The checks 
were in the respective amounts of $25,000, $100,000 and $125,000. 
 Brown and Michael did not inform Ostroff that they had received 
any of these checks nor did they obtain any agreement directly 
from Ostroff governing release of the proceeds.  Brown and 





account because no bank account had yet been opened in the 
Corporation’s name.  Brown and Michael asked Rubinstein to 
provide them with written consent from both Ostroff and 
Rubinstein giving them and the law firm the authority to disburse 
the funds from the trust account when requested by either Rubin 
or the Corporation. 
 After the first two checks had been deposited in the trust 
account, either Rubin or Rubinstein requested that the law firm 
release $25,000 of the proceeds.  That request was not 
immediately honored, however, Rubinstein as Brown and Michael 
refused to release the funds without Ostroff’s written approval. 
Consequently, Brown, Michael and Rubinstein agreed that a limited 
power of attorney would be furnished that would provide the 
requested authorization, and a limited power of attorney was 
prepared in mid June of 1989.  The Estate contends that this 
limited power of attorney was prepared by Brown and Michael, not 
by Ostroff, and claims that Rubinstein arranged for Brown and 
Michael to receive the power of attorney directly, rather than 
giving it to Ostroff.  Whether in fact Brown and Michael prepared 
the power of attorney is not clear; but it is clear that the 
power of attorney stated that Ostroff's name was "Della," rather 
than "Ella," in two different places.   
 Whatever may have been the provenance of the power of 
attorney, Rubinstein admitted that he signed Ostroff's name to 
it.  However, claims that he signed Ostroff's name at her 
direction.  Helen Conn, a notary public under the laws of New 





signature on that document as a favor to Rubinstein.  She 
concedes that she did so even though she did not witness the 
signature and did not know Ostroff.  The notarized limited power 
of attorney was then returned to Brown and Michael.  
 It is undisputed that Ostroff never signed the power of 
attorney and the Estate claims that she never authorized 
Rubinstein to sign for her.  The Estate also claims that when 
Brown and Michael received the limited power, they noticed the 
misspelling of Ostroff’s first name and either they or Rubinstein 
corrected the misspelling with “white-out”.   
 Under the terms of the limited power, Ostroff appeared to 
appoint Rubinstein her attorney-in-fact for the limited purpose 
of: 
[a]uthorizing the law firm of Brown & Michael to 
release funds held by it, deposited by me, in 
its Attorney Trust Account. 
 
(A1027).  In addition to the power of attorney, Brown and Michael 
also received a fax transmission of a letter from Rubinstein, 
dated June 15, 1989, authorizing Brown and Michael to release the 
funds from the firm's trust account upon Rubin’s request.  The 
letter was addressed to Michael and stated in part: 
You are hereby authorized to release funds from your 
firm's trust account, upon the request of Sam 




 Beginning on June 15, 1989, Brown and Michael issued a 
series of checks from their trust account pursuant to Rubin’s 





second was for $25,000, and the third was for $200,000 which was 
the balance of Ostroff’s funds.  Brown and Michael did not notify 
Ostroff of any of these disbursements, nor did they provide any 
accounting to Ostroff.  Rather, they relied solely upon the 
limited power of attorney, the fax from Rubinstein, and Rubin’s 
requests that funds be released.  
 However, on July 27, 1989, an Investment Agreement  
“materialized.”  That Agreement, which recites that it is between 
the St. Lucia Hotel Corporation and Ella Ostroff and which is 
apparently signed by Sam Rubin, as President of the Corporation, 
and Ella Ostroff, provides that Ostroff will pay the Corporation 
$250,000 in return for a 3% interest in the Corporation, and 
specifies how and when she is to be repaid.2 (Sa001-002).  The 
                     
     2The relevant portion of the Investment Agreement provides: 
 
   IT IS, on this 27th day of July, 1989, hereby agreed 
between the parties as follows: 
 
   1.  Ella Ostroff shall pay to St. Lucia Hotel 
Corporation the sum of Two Hundred Fifty 
Thousand Dollars ($250,000). 
 
   2.  In consideration of the payment of the Two 
Hundred Fifty (sic) Dollars ($250,000) 
described in Paragraph 1 above, Ella Ostroff 
shall receive a three percent (3%) interest 
in St. Lucia Hotel Corporation.  This 
interest will not be diluted in any way 
without the prior written consent of Ella 
Ostroff. 
 
   3.  St. Lucia Hotel Corporation shall apply the Two 
Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($250,000) 
referred to in Paragraph 1 above as follows: 
 
a. One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars 
($125,000) shall be applied to the 







Estate attacks the authenticity of this document and asserts that 
neither Brown, Michael, nor Rubin ever saw a signed original, and 
that Ostroff did not recall signing it.  In addition, the Estate 
hints that Rubinstein “doctored” Ostroff’s signature on the 
Agreement.  Rubinstein claims that Ostroff did sign the 
Investment Agreement and that it is genuine.  Although Ostroff 
apparently intended the funds in the trust account to be held to 
pay the Corporation’s legitimate and ongoing expenses, she never 
had any contact with Brown & Michael nor did she ever see any 
bills.  Nevertheless, at her deposition Ostroff contended that: 
“That $250,000 was -- I think the checks, it was three, 
and they went to Brown & Michael, a law firm 
in Atlantic City that I understood 
represented the hotel corporation.  They were 
to pay bills that I approved, not just pay, 
but that I knew about and approved of.” 
 
Ostroff deposition at A1192-1193.  Ostroff claimed that the money 
was not an investment.  “Not the way I understood it. . . It was 
an escrow.  I understood they were holding it in escrow, Brown 
                                                                  
b. One Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars 
($125,000) shall be applied to the 
condominium project at Rodney Bay, 
St. Lucia. 
 
4.  St. Lucia Hotel Corporation shall repay to Ella 
Ostroff the sum of One Hundred Twenty-Five 
Thousand Dollars ($125,000) upon the full and 
final funding of bond to be underwritten by 
Kirchner Moore & Company estimated to occur 
on or before November 30, 1989. 
 
5.  St. Lucia Hotel Corporation shall repay to Ella 
Ostroff an additional sum of One Hundred 
Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($125,000) at 
such time that construction financing for the 
condominium project at Rodney Bay, St. Lucia 





and Michael.”  Id. at 1193-1194. 
 It is undisputed that Ostroff was actively involved in the 
Project from June 1989 through April 1990.  She traveled to St. 
Lucia, Hong Kong and New York in connection with the Project, and 
she paid the firm of Laventhal & Horwath to study the Project.  
However, at a meeting in her home, Ostroff told Rubin that she 
had no intention of proceeding with the financing that Rubin was 
relying upon.  
 Finally, in April of 1990, Ostroff wrote a letter to 
Rubinstein complaining that he had misled her as to the 
Corporation’s ownership of the land on which the Project was to 
be built.  In August or September of 1990, Laventhal & Horwath’s 
feasibility study confirmed that the Corporation did not own that 
land.   
 Numerous law suits ensued, the details of which are not 
relevant to our inquiry.3  The instant suit was filed against the 
law firm of Brown and Michael, G. Michael Brown, Guy Michael and 
Greenberg Margolis4 as successor to Brown & Michael.  The 
defendants in turn filed a third-party complaint for 
                     
     3 Ostroff v. Rubinstein, No. 90-1601 (C.C.P. Phila., filed 
November 8, 1990)(referred to as the Rubenstein Document Suit by 
the Estate); Ostroff v. Rubinstein, No. 90-1225 (C.C.P. Phila., 
filed November 8, 1990)(the Rubenstein Fraud Suit); Ostroff v. 
Ruben (sic), No. 90-7197 (E.D.Pa., filed November 9, 1990)(the 
Rubin Fraud Suit); Ostroff v. Resolution Trust Corp. as Receiver 
for Security Savings Bank, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12639, aff’d, 
993 F.2d 225 (3d Cir. 1993). 
     4Sometime in 1990 Brown and Michael dissolved their 
partnership and joined the law firm of Greenberg, Margolis.  
However, after the filing of Ostroff’s complaint, they left 





indemnification against Rubinstein, Rubin and Conn.  Conn then 
cross-claimed against Rubinstein and Rubin, and Rubin, in turn, 
cross-claimed against Ostroff.  Ostroff then dismissed Greenberg, 
Margolis and amended her complaint to assert a direct claim 
against Conn.  Prior to the matter going to trial, however, Ms. 
Ostroff died and Jack Villanueva was appointed administrator 
pendente lite of her estate and was substituted as plaintiff.  
 That brings us to the instant complaint which alleges that 
the release of funds from Brown & Michael’s trust account without 
authorization from, or notice to, Ostroff constitutes conversion 
and a breach of:  the escrow agreement, the fiduciary duty owed 
to Ostroff, and the lawyers' duty of good faith and loyalty.  The 
instant suit also alleges that Conn was negligent, and that she 
breached her professional duty as a notary public by notarizing 
the limited power of attorney without actually witnessing 
Ostroff’s execution of that document.   
 The suit proceeded to trial, and at the conclusion of 
Ostroff’s case, the district court granted the defendants’ motion 
for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
50(a), and entered an order dismissing the complaint.5  The 
                     
     5 By Orders dated December 20, 1994 and January 10, 1995, 
the district court dismissed Ostroff’s complaint against Brown & 
Michael, and Conn.  The defendants’/third party plaintiffs’ 
complaint against Conn, Rubin and Rubinstein; and Rubin’s 
counterclaim against Ostroff were dismissed by agreement of the 
parties.  However, the district court's dismissal of Ostroff's 
complaint was incorrect because once judgment as a matter of law 
was entered,  that judgment disposed of the entire case.  Thus, 
it was improper to also dismiss the complaint.  However, since 
judgment was entered, we will ignore that procedural anomaly and 





court’s action was based upon its rulings that (1) Brown and 
Michael had a right to rely on the limited power of attorney and 
the letter from Rubinstein when they made the disbursements from 
the trust account; (2) the Estate failed to demonstrate a causal 
connection between Ostroff's alleged loss and Brown and Michael 
disbursing the funds; and (3) Ostroff’s actions constituted  a 
ratification of the use of her funds for the Project. 




 The standard for granting judgment as a matter of law is set 
forth in Fed. R.Civ. P. 50(a). That Rule provides: 
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard 
on an issue and there is no legally 
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable 
jury to find for that party on that issue, 
the court may determine the issue against 
that party and may grant a motion for 
judgment as a matter of law against that 
party with respect to a claim or defense that 
cannot under the controlling law be 
maintained or defeated without a favorable 
finding on that issue. 
 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a).   Our review of the district court’s grant of 
judgment as a matter of law is plenary.  St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 935 F.2d 1428, 1431 (3d Cir. 1991).  We apply 
the same standard as the trial court.  Rotondo v. Keene Corp., 
956 F.2d 436, 438 (3d Cir. 1992).  The question is whether, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing 
party, no jury could decide in that person's favor.  Walter v. 





focus of our inquiry is not on whether there is literally no 
evidence supporting the unsuccessful party, but whether there is 
evidence upon which a reasonable jury could properly base its 
verdict.  Gomez v. Allegheny Health Services, Inc., 71 F.3d 1079, 
1083 (3d Cir. 1995).  A judgment as a matter of law must be 
sustained if the  record is critically deficient of the minimum 
quantum of evidence from which the jury might reasonably afford 
relief.  Id.   However, "[i]f the evidence is of such character 
that reasonable [persons], in the impartial exercise of their 
judgment may reach different conclusions, the case should be 
submitted to the jury."  J.I. Hass Co., Inc. v. Gilbane Bldg. 
Co., 881 F.2d 89, 92 (3d Cir. 1989)(citation omitted).   
 
 III. 
 It is appellant’s idée fixe that Ostroff was an elderly 
woman whose failing health caused her to fall victim to the 
outrageous fraud allegedly perpetrated by Rubin and Rubinstein.  
The accuracy of that assertion, however, is immaterial to the 
resolution of this appeal.  The appellant does not allege any 
fraudulent conduct on the part of Brown, Michael or Conn.  
Although appellant alleges that Rubinstein forged Ostroff's 
signature to the limited power of attorney, there is no 
allegation that either Brown or Michael knew of the alleged 
forgery or had any reason to suspect that the limited power of 
attorney was the product of a forgery or was otherwise invalid. 
The Estate does mention the misspellings of Ostroff's name on the 





that error, but concedes that Brown and Michael disbursed the 
funds in reliance upon the documents they were presented with.6 
 The Estate contends that Brown and Michael were not 
justified in relying on the limited power in releasing the funds. 
 The Estate argues that even though there was a limited power of 
attorney, Brown and Michael had a duty to (1) notify Ostroff that 
her $250,000 had been received; (2) secure a written agreement 
governing the disbursement of those funds; (3) provide notice of 
the requests to release the funds; and (4) provide Ostroff with 
an accounting.  In essence, Ostroff argues that, had Brown and 
Michael notified her of each requested disbursement, she would 
have been in a position to review the request and possibly 
withhold approval.  However, because Brown and Michael did not 
notify her of Rubin’s requested disbursements she lost $250,000. 
 At trial, Ostroff produced the testimony of Edward Wachs who 
testified as an expert.7  Wachs is a New Jersey attorney who 
testified that he has practiced real estate and probate law for 
over 25 years and has had extensive experience handling attorney 
trust accounts.  He opined that Brown and Michael "breached the 
duty of care which [they] owed to Ostroff based on the standard 
                     
     6   See ¶ 41 of Amended Complaint (“Brown & Michael relied 
upon the Limited Power of Attorney notarized by Conn, a New 
Jersey notary, and upon Conn’s Certificate of Acknowledgment in 
releasing the funds.”); and Brief of Appellant at 11 ("In 
reliance on the altered Limited Power of Attorney, which Brown & 
Michael believed to be valid because of Conn's notarization of 
Mrs. Ostroff's signature, by check dated June 15, 1989, Brown & 
Michael paid $25,000 from Mrs. Ostroff's funds upon Rubin's 
request to Carnicon.").    






of care of the average New Jersey attorney."8  Brief of Appellant 
at 16.  According to Wachs, the duty of care included a duty to 
notify Ostroff of the receipt of each of her three checks; to 
obtain a written agreement with Ostroff governing the release of 
the funds; and, absent such agreement, to notify Ostroff of each 
request for a distribution.  He testified that the duty also 
included a duty to notify Ostroff that they had received the 
limited power of attorney from Rubinstein, to notify her of the 
distribution of the funds, and to provide an accounting.  Wachs 
opined that each duty was independent of the existence of the 
limited power of attorney.  In short, in Wachs' view, Brown and 
Michael were not justified in relying on the limited power of 
attorney in making the disbursements from the trust account. 
 In rejecting this view the district court properly held that 
an attorney's duty under New Jersey law is a question of law to 
be decided by the court.  See Wang v. Allstate Ins. Co., 592 A.2d 
527, 534 (N.J. 1991) ("The question of whether a duty  exists is 
a matter of law properly decided by the court, not the jury, and 
is largely a matter of fairness or policy.").   
 The Estate bases the duty it asserts on three New Jersey 
Supreme Court cases.  It cites In re Carlsen, 111 A.2d 393, 397 
(N.J. 1955), for the general proposition that an attorney's 
                     
     8Appellant characterizes this case as one of legal 
malpractice and repeatedly speaks of Brown and Michael's breach 
of the standard of care of the average New Jersey attorney.  
However, it has been neither alleged nor established that there 
was ever an attorney-client relationship between Ostroff and 
Brown or Michael or their firm.  In fact, appellant concedes that 






"professional obligation reaches all persons who have reason to 
rely on him even though not strictly clients."  It cites In re 
Gavel, 125 A.2d 696, 704 (N.J. 1956) for the proposition that 
"money of the client or money collected for the client or other 
trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be 
reported and accounted for promptly. . . ."  Finally, the Estate 
relies heavily upon In re Power, 451 A.2d 666 (N.J. 1982) to 
support its contention that Brown and Michael were not justified 
in relying upon the limited power of attorney. 
 However, these cases do not support the proposition urged by 
the Estate.  In In re Power, a New Jersey attorney (Power), 
represented a builder (Day), who agreed to convey a parcel of 
land on which he was to build a house for the Handwerkers.  Power 
prepared a binder for Day, pursuant to which the Handwerkers paid 
a deposit of $1,000 which Power deposited into his trust account. 
 The binder recited that the Handwerkers' $1,000 deposit would be 
returned in the event a contract was not executed within 15 days. 
 No contract was ever executed, and the Handwerkers 
eventually wrote to Power and requested that their deposit be 
returned.  However, before receiving that request, Day had 
contacted an architect, and Day owed that architect an 
outstanding balance of $955.  Day and the Handwerkers disputed 
who was responsible for that bill, but despite that dispute, 
Power disbursed $955 of the Handwerker’s deposit to Day who used 
the money to pay the architect's bill.  However, Power 
subsequently obtained the money from Day and returned it to his 





that the Handwerkers had approved the disbursement in defending 
against a complaint that the Handwerkers filed with the 
Disciplinary Board.  The local Ethics Committee and the 
Disciplinary Review Board concluded that Power's unauthorized 
disbursement in the face of an "express written prohibition" was 
conduct that adversely reflected upon his fitness to practice 
law.  Id. at 667.  The Supreme Court of New Jersey agreed saying: 
[R]espondent was not justified in relying solely on his 
client's representation, particularly in the 
face of the written demand from complainants, 
who were unrepresented by counsel, that their 
deposit be returned.  A simple telephone call 
or short letter to complainants seeking 
confirmation of the disbursement arrangement 
would have fulfilled the ethical obligation 
and avoided or at least foreshortened an 
entirely unnecessary acrimonious dispute. 
 
Id.   That is clearly not our case.  Here, Brown & Michael had no 
written request from Ostroff for the return of her funds.  On the 
contrary, they had a writing (in the proper form) that 
purportedly allowed them to make the disbursements at issue. 
 In In re Carlsen, an attorney entered into a business 
relationship with his client.  The attorney misled the client, 
and never made the contributions to the deal that he was 
obligated to make under agreements between him and the client.  
The venture eventually failed, and the client discovered that the 
attorney had not lived up to his end of the bargain.  The 
attorney  attempted to justify his conduct by arguing that he was 
not functioning as the client’s attorney, but as his business 
partner, and therefore, did not owe a heightened duty to 
disclose.  The court was less than impressed by that argument. 





attorney-client relationship between Bush and 
himself insofar as the Puerto Rican venture 
was concerned, but we reject this position 
without hesitation. Bush was a general client 
and was brought to the venture by his general 
attorney. True, they . . . both participated 
as principals but that did not remove the 
trust and confidence of their relationship. . 
. . [T]his court [has] expressly recognized 
that an attorney who wishes to be a business 
man must act in his business transactions 
with high standards and that his professional 
obligation reaches all persons who have 
reason to rely on him even though ‘not 
strictly clients.’ 
 
17 N.J. at 345-6.  
 In In re Gavel, an attorney who was trying to sell a 
client’s property made false and misleading representations to 
that client and to banks involved in financing.  In the process 
of attempting to extricate the client from financial 
difficulties, the attorney conveyed the client's real estate to 
his own wife and remortgaged the real estate to pay the client's 
debts while retaining the profits from the refinancing for 
himself.  He also commingled the client’s funds with his own and 
regularly used client trust funds for unauthorized purposes.  In 
finding the attorney had violated the Canons of Professional 
Ethics the court spoke specifically of his pattern of 
reprehensible conduct, and noted the duty an attorney owes to 
clients, and the public in general.  
To the public [a lawyer] is a lawyer whether 
he acts in a representative capacity or 
otherwise. . .  
‘The fiduciary obligation of a lawyer 
applies to persons who, although not 
strictly clients, he has or should have 
reason to believe rely on him. 
 





scope of Ostroff's purported reliance.  She was relying upon them 
to make disbursements when requested; and that is what they did. 
 Although we agree with the Estate’s contention that Brown 
and Michael are required to conduct their practice in accordance 
with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the record before 
us does not establish that their conduct breached that Code.   
Brown and Michael did not receive any funds on Ostroff’s behalf 
from a financial institution or any other person or institution. 
 Instead, they received three checks which Ostroff admittedly 
signed and caused to be mailed to them.  The Estate cites us to 
no authority that supports its position that an attorney who 
receives funds properly mailed to him or her has a duty to inform 
the sender when those funds are received, and we are aware of no 
such authority.  Moreover, although it can not be denied that an 
attorney owes a duty to the public in general9, the evidence 
before the district court was addressed specifically to an 
attorney’s duty to Ostroff, and whether Brown and Michael 
breached that duty individually, or acting as the law firm.  
Significantly, Brown and Michael did not convert Ostroff’s funds 
to a personal use.  They neither derived any personal gain from 
her funds nor did they attempt to.  They merely disbursed the 
funds to a project that she had intended receive them.  The fact 
that she later became dissatisfied with the Project she was 
                     
     9 In Gavel the court noted:  "In addition to the duties and 
obligations of an attorney to his client, he is responsible to 
the courts, to the profession of the law, and to the public . . . 
." 
 





investing in hardly translates into a breach of duty on the part 
of Brown & Michael. 
 We cannot agree with appellant’s rather strained argument 
that Brown and Michael had a duty to notify Ostroff of the 
receipt of funds she had mailed to them in the first place.  Had 
Ostroff wanted to be notified when the funds were received she 
could have, and we suspect would have, so requested or used a 
method of delivery that would have so informed her. 
   We believe that any duty that Brown & Michael owed to 
Ostroff springs not from any duty of an attorney, but from the 
law of agency governing powers of attorney.  “A power of attorney 
is an instrument in writing by which one person, as principal, 
appoints another as his agent and confers upon him the authority 
to perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on behalf of 
the principal."  Kisselbach v. County of Camden, 638 A.2d. 1383, 
1386 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).  The primary purpose of a 
power of attorney is not to define the authority conferred on the 
agent by the principal, but to provide third persons with 
evidence of agency authority.  Id.  “It should be construed in 
accordance with the rules for interpreting written instruments 
generally.” Id.   
 Here, Rubinstein presented Brown and Michael with a limited 
power of attorney, which contained a notarial seal.  Ostroff 
thereby purported to appoint Rubinstein her agent, and appeared 
to give him the authority to authorize Brown and Michael to 
release the funds she had deposited with them.  “Authority may be 





indicate principal’s desires, but no more is authorized.” Id. 
(citing Restatement 2d of Agency §§ 26 and 33 (1958)). 
Rubinstein's alleged forgery of the document does not support an 
inference that Brown & Michael were parties to any impropriety.  
They were entitled to conclude that they had been given the 
authority to make disbursements on behalf of Ostroff.  
Furthermore, Rubinstein provided Brown and Michael with a letter 
authorizing them to release funds for the use of the Project upon 
Rubin’s request.  Brown and Michael properly relied upon the 
limited power, and Rubinstein’s letter, to make disbursements 
from their trust account.  We find nothing in the circumstances 
before us that would require Brown and Michael to notify Ostroff 
each time Rubin made a request for a distribution. 
 Rather, we find the reasoning of the court in Heine v. 
Newman, Tannenbaum, Helpern, Syracuse & Hirschtritt, 856 F. Supp. 
190 (S.D. N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 50 F.3d 2 (2d Cir. 1995), 
persuasive.  There, Heine retained an attorney named Ashley to 
help sell a condominium that Heine owned.  Ashley did procure a 
buyer and so informed Heine.  Heine then executed a power of  
attorney giving Ashley “the power to ‘take all steps’ necessary 
to execute the sale of the condominium.”  Id. at 192.  Pursuant 
to the power, Ashley retained the law firm of Newman, Tannenbaum, 
Helpern, Syracuse & Hirschtritt (“Newman, Tannenbaum”) to 
represent Heine and to handle the closing.  Ashley served as 
Heine’s attorney-in-fact at the closing, and Newman, Tannenbaum 
served as Heine’s counsel.  The proceeds of the sale were 





and one of which was payable to Heine.  Ashley misappropriated 
Heine’s check and Heine sued Newman, Tannenbaum asserting that 
despite the existence of the power of attorney, the firm breached 
the duty of care it owed to Heine.  Heine argued that the breach 
occurred by the firm “complying with Ashley’s instructions and by 
permitting the checks to be drawn payable to and delivered to 
Ashley without first communicating with Heine. . . .”  Id.  The 
court rejected that argument stating: 
   If parties were required to verify with the 
principal each instruction given to them by 
an attorney-in-fact, the authority given to 
attorneys-in-fact would be eviscerated.  No 
party to a transaction would rely on the 
statements of attorneys-in-fact without 
independent verification from the principal, 
and, accordingly, an attorney-in-fact would 
not be authorized to take any and all acts as 
fully as the principal.  If a principal were 
permitted, at a future point in time, to 
decide that a particular instruction should 
have been verified, parties to a contract 
could not and would not be able to rely on 
the statements or instructions of attorneys-
in-fact. 
 
Id. at 195 (citations omitted).   
 We agree.  We realize that here, unlike in Heine, the 
validity of the power of attorney is in question.   However, 
since Brown & Michael did not know that Ostroff's signature was a 
forgery that distinction is of no consequence.  If Ostroff was a 
victim of a fraud, she was a victim of Rubinstein and/or Rubin’s 
fraud, and not one perpetrated by Brown & Michael.  Accordingly, 
the district court did not err in awarding judgment to Brown & 
Michael as a matter of law.10 
                     
     10 The amended complaint also contains a count alleging that 





 The Estate seeks to distinguish Heine by pointing out that 
it concerned a general power of attorney, not a limited power of 
attorney as we have here.  See Estate's Brief, at 35-6.  That is 
a distinction without a difference.  It goes only to the scope of 
the authority conferred upon the principal.  It does not alter or 
diminish the right of a third party to rely upon it when dealing 
with a principal who appears to be acting within the scope of his 
or her authority.  Kisselbach, supra. 
 IV. 
 As noted above, Ostroff has asserted a direct claim against 
Conn alleging that Conn was both negligent and guilty of a breach 
of a professional duty in notarizing the limited power of 
attorney without actually witnessing Ostroff's signature.  The 
court did not specifically address the claims against Conn.  
Rather, the court ruled that the defendants did not breach any 
duty, and if they did, Ostroff’s conduct amounted to a 
ratification of the defendants’ actions thereby absolving them of 
any liability.  However, Conn’s conduct here is quite different 
from that of Brown & Michael.  We must first decide if she 
breached any duty and, if she did, we must decide if the record 
establishes a ratification by Ostroff.  
 Conn notarized the limited power of attorney without 
witnessing Ostroff's execution of it and Ostroff's purported 
ratification of the disbursements by Brown and Michael is 
                                                                  
did not discuss this particular allegation.  However, it is clear 
that appellant produced no evidence that either Brown or Michael 
used any funds Ostroff deposited in the trust account for their 





irrelevant to any determination of whether Conn breached her duty 
as a notary in doing so.  A notary is a public officer and owes a 
duty to the public to discharge his or her functions with 
diligence.  Immerman v. Ostertag, 199 A.2d 869, 872-873 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1964).  However, under New Jersey law, a 
notary is not an insurer and is not liable except for negligence. 
 Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Burt Thomas-Aitken Construction 
Co., 253 A.2d 469, 471 (N.J. 1969).  A notary has a duty to 
refrain from acts or omissions which constitute negligence.  That 
is “a duty which he owes not only to persons with whom he has 
privity but also to any member of the public who, in reasonable 
contemplation, might rely on the officer’s certification.”  
Immerman v. Ostertag, 199 A.2d at 872.  “With respect to the 
identities of signers, the law requires nothing more of the 
notary than the use of a reasonable care to satisfy himself or, 
in other words, to become satisfied in his own conscience that 
the signers are the persons they purport to be.”  Id. at 873.   
 It is apparent that Conn affixed her notarial seal to the 
limited power of attorney only as a favor to Rubinstein without 
taking any steps reasonably calculated to insure the genuineness 
of the signature.  This was clearly negligent and breached the 
duty that Conn owed to the public as a notary. 
 However, it is not enough that a notary’s negligence be 
shown in order for a plaintiff to recover against a notary.  A 
causal relationship between the notary’s negligence and Ostroff’s 
loss must be shown.  Id. at 874.  From the record developed thus 





they thought the notarized power of attorney evidenced.11  
Accordingly, we must determine if the district court correctly 
concluded that Ostroff ratified the disbursements from the trust 
account.  If Ostroff did ratify the disbursements, Conn’s 
negligence was of no consequence. 
 In Thermo Contracting Corp. v. Bank of New Jersey, 354 A.2d 
291, the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote: 
Ratification is defined in Section 82 of the 
Restatement of Agency 2d (1957): 
 
Ratification is the affirmance by a person of a 
prior act which did not bind him 
but which was done, or professedly 
done on his account, whereby the 
act, as to some or all persons, is 
given effect as if originally done 
by him. 
 
Ratification requires intent to ratify plus full 
knowledge of all the material facts.  
Ratification may be express or implied, and 
intent may be inferred from the failure to 
repudiate an unauthorized act, from inaction, 
or from conduct on the part of the principal 
which is inconsistent with any other position 
than intent to adopt the act.   
 
A ratification, once effected, cannot later be revoked, 
even where the ratification may have been 
induced by the anticipation of benefits which 
fail to accrue. 
 
                      ********************** 
 
A principal must either ratify the entire transaction 
                     
     11 We cannot determine from the record whether Conn was 
employed by Brown & Michael.  Nonetheless, we note that a private 
employer of a notary public is not vicariously liable for the 
notary’s negligence or breach of duty unless the private employer 
participated in the breach or negligence or unless the private 
employer led another to believe that the notary was acting for it 
and on its behalf.  Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York v. Burt 
Thomas-Aitken Const. Co., 230 A.2d 498, 501 (N.J. 1967).  Here, 
there is no allegation in the amended complaint that either basis 





or repudiate it entirely, and cannot pick and 
chose only what is advantageous to him. 
 
(emphasis added). 354 A.2d at 361-362.  In holding as a matter of 
law that Ostroff ratified the disbursements, the district court 
made the following findings.12  First, the power of attorney and 
the letter from Rubinstein to Brown & Michael indicated a 
"continuing authorization to deal with the funds." (A1010).  
Second, the Investment Agreement itself contains no conditions 
and no restraints on the release of the funds. (A1011-12). Third, 
Ostroff brought three lawsuits against Rubin and Rubinstein and 
in each lawsuit she used the Investment Agreement as evidence 
that she invested her $250,000 in the Project.13 (A1012).  
Fourth, a note written by the plaintiff which indicates that she 
is to be repaid $125,000.  The court found the use of the word 
"re-pay" to be "consistent with the Investment Agreement." 
(A1013).  Fifth, Ostroff was an active player in the Project.  
She attempted to arrange financing, traveled to St. Lucia, New 
York and Hong Kong, and paid to have a study done by Laventhal 
and Howarth.  (A1013-14).  On the basis of all these occurrences, 
the court concluded: 
                     
     12 The district court did not issue a written opinion.  The 
court’s ruling on the defendants' Rule 50(a) motion was given 
from the bench.  Thus, the citations and references from the 
district court’s opinion are references to the appellant’s 
appendix which contains the transcript of the court’s ruling. 
     13The district court was mistaken in its finding that 
Ostroff used the Investment Agreement as evidence that she 
invested $250,000 in the Project in the three different lawsuits 
she filed against Rubinstein and Rubin.  The Investment Agreement 
and Ostroff’s investment in the Project are referred in only two 
of the suits, i.e. in the Rubinstein Fraud Suit at ¶¶ 6 and 25 
and in the Rubin Fraud Suit at ¶¶ 5 and 6.  There is no reference 





Therefore, without evidence in the record, this court 
can't have this jury speculate that the 
monies that were spent would not have been 
authorized by her because in fact it came at 
a time when, if anything, she was working to 
insure the success of the project.  It if 
(sic) failed in that early stage because of 
lack of financing, why is it not reasonable 
to conclude that it was because of her 
inability to line up financing.  But it's not 
for us to speculate whether or why there was 
the failure of the project, but just to view 
what her activities were at that time.  Now 
it could very well be that she was deceived 
by Rubin and Rubinstein.  But a party who 
deals through agents can't then turn around 
and have the failures of that agent visited 
upon someone else without that someone else 
having some information, some notice which 
appears to be the very thing that the 
plaintiff was attempting to do here with 
respect to Brown and Michael. 
 
   And I do feel that under all the circumstances and 
certainly there is more in the record that 
all her activities and actions indicate that 
she was an active participant, fully aware of 
what the up-to-date financing of the project 
was.  She was the prime mover  up to that 
point.  She expended money from the 
Corporation.  She cannot now without any 
record facts turn around and say I've 
suffered a loss of two hundred fifty thousand 




 We disagree with the conclusion of the learned trial judge. 
 We do not believe that this record supports a finding of 
ratification as a matter of law.  First, Ostroff claims that she 
had no recollection of signing the Investment Agreement and the 
original Agreement apparently no longer exists.  The authenticity 
of that document is therefore, clearly in dispute.  Second, even 
if Ostroff did sign the Investment Agreement, she did so on July 





claims she first became aware of the disbursements from the Brown 
& Michael trust account.  Her act of signing the Investment 
Agreement clearly does not ratify an event which had not yet 
occurred.  She can not ratify an action that she is not aware of. 
 Thermo Contracting Corp., 354 A.2d at 361.  All of Ostroff’s 
activities on behalf of the Project took place before October of 
1990, when it is alleged that she first learned of the 
disbursements.  Once Ostroff learned of the disbursements in 
October of 1990, she immediately started suit against Rubinstein 
and Rubin to recover the $250,000.  The institution of two 
lawsuits to recover the funds is certainly not consistent with 
ratification of the disbursements.  Third, as the Estate argues, 
even if the Investment Agreement is genuine, its terms do not 
expressly contradict the contention that no funds would be 
disbursed from the trust account without Ostroff’s approval.    
 We believe that the evidence here is of such a character 
that “reasonable [persons], in the impartial exercise of their 
judgment may reach different conclusions” on the resolution of 
the ratification issue.  J.I. Hass Co., Inc. v. Gilbane Bldg. 
Co., 881 F.2d at 92.   Thus, we find that the district court’s 
grant of judgment as a matter of law on the ratification issue 
improperly deprived the appellant of a jury fact-determination as 
to Conn's liability.  Accordingly, we must remand to the district 
court for a factual determination of the ratification issue as to 
Conn.   
 In addition, because the district court inappropriately 





further issue of whether Conn’s negligence was the proximate 
cause of any loss or damage to Ostroff should it ultimately be 
determined that Ostroff’s actions did not constitute 
ratification.  Although it could be argued that any damages the 
Estate can prove are equal to the amount of Ostroff's deposits 
into the trust account, we do not think that the matter can be so 
easily resolved.  On this record, it appears that all of 
Ostroff's funds did go to the Project that she intended to 
finance.   While she did not receive the return that she no doubt 
anticipated when she sent the checks to Brown & Michael, that may 
be because the Project was not a profitable one, not because her 
funds were diverted to an unintended use.  Therefore, it is 
possible that, notwithstanding Conn's breach and notwithstanding 
a lack of ratification, the Estate will not be able to prove that 
it was damaged to the extent claimed.  However, we take no 
position as to the Estate's ability to establish whether Ostroff 
suffered any damages or the amount of any such damages.  Rather, 
upon remand the district court will have to determine the amount 
of damages, if any, to which the Estate is entitled if it is 
determined that Ostroff did not ratify the disbursements, and 
that Conn's breach caused such damages. 
  V. 
 Finally, the Estate contends that the district court 
improperly precluded it from introducing evidence of Rubinstein’s 
conviction for wire fraud and Ostroff’s alleged poor health.  The 
Estate wanted to introduce evidence of Rubinstein’s wire fraud 





operandi."  Appellant's Brief at 40.  It wanted to introduce 
testimony about Ostroff’s alleged poor health in order “to 
provid[e] a rationale for the belief of Rubinstein and Rubin that 
they could succeed with the fraud, which is self-evident: they 
thought (correctly) that she was going to die and thus there 
would be no witness against their version of the transaction."  
Appellant's Brief at 41-42. 
 The Estate forgets that this case is against Brown & Michael 
and Conn.  There are no allegations that they participated in any 
fraud against Ostroff or that they believed Rubinstein or Rubin 
were victimizing her.  Thus, any evidence of Rubinstein’s prior 
conviction or of Ostroff’s health is totally irrelevant to the 
claim against these defendants.  
 
 VI. 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the grant of judgment 
as a matter of law to the law firm of Brown and Michael, G. 
Michael Brown and Guy Michael, reverse the grant of judgment as a 
matter of law to Helen Conn, and remand for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
